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Summary Healthcare workers may acquire methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) from patients, both hospital and home environments, other health-
care workers, family and public acquaintances, and pets. There is a consensus of
case reports and series which now strongly support the role for MRSA-carrying health-
care personnel to serve as a reservoir and as a vehicle of spread within healthcare
settings. Carriage may occur at a number of body sites and for short, intermediate,
and long terms. A number of approaches have been taken to interrupt the linkage of
staff—patient spread, but most emphasis has been placed on handwashing and the
treatment of staff MRSA carriers. The importance of healthcare workers in transmis-
sion has been viewedwith varying degrees of interest, and several logistical problems
have arisen when healthcare worker screening is brought to the forefront. There is
now considerable support for the screening and treatment of healthcare workers,
but it is suggested that the intensity of any such approach must consider available
resources, the nature of the outbreak, and the strength of epidemiological associa-
tions. The task of assessing healthcare personnel carriage in any context should be
shaped with due regard to national and international guidelines, should be honed and
practiced according to local needs and experience, and must be patient-oriented.
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he hands and gloves of those who have not yet
nitiated patient contact, thereby emphasizing the
nvironmental reservoir [14]. Handwashing has a
ritical role in containment [15], but opportunity
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or healthcare personnel to spread MRSA extends
eyond direct hand contact.
The establishment and role of the carrier state
or S. aureus is well documented albeit more so
or methicillin-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) [16].
uch documentation includes many excellent exam-
les of the role for medical staff carriage [17,18].
n a general sense, the carrier is more likely
o disperse staphylococci when the quantitation,
specially for nasal carriage, in the reservoir is high
19,20]. Increased numbers of patient coloniza-
ions or infections are soon followed and paralleled
y staff carriage [21,22]. That is, the healthcare
orker in implicated most often as an innocent
ystander. As a consequence of inadequate health-
are worker adherence to preventative strategies
nd the subsequent lack of recognition of the
ealthcare worker reservoir, existing precautions
ay be doomed to occasional failure given the
otential for inapparent vectors [15].
The role of the healthcare worker in secondary
pread during outbreaks has become established
23], and there are several reports where either
ndividual or multiple staff have putatively con-
ributed to dissemination (Table 1). The consensus
f these publications suggests that healthcare per-
onnel do have a signiﬁcant role in some contexts.
ost such transmission was associated with nurses
ho have the most direct contact with patients.
he occasion of transmission has taken place in
any acute and chronic care hospital settings, and
he healthcare worker has been colonized often
nknowingly. Overall, it is becoming increasingly
ecognized that healthcare worker carriage has the
otential to complicate the control of MRSA in med-
cal settings [5,6,19,43,46—60].
eek and ye shall ﬁnd
he origin of MRSA is often thought to have arisenMoving forward on strength ..........................
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There is an accelerated interest being directed
to methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), perhaps being fueled in large part by the
explosive nature of community-acquired MRSA
spread worldwide [1]. In parallel, control of
MRSA has become a renewed focus. Reservoirs
for MRSA include three major foci: patients and
their families and pets, inanimate environment,
and caregivers [2]. Whereas most emphases on
control have related to patients, it is becoming
more widely accepted that other reservoirs need
to be more seriously considered.
From a pragmatist’s perspective, the infected or
carrier human is a key source for the bacterium. It
is thereafter less relevant that the human is either
a patient or caregiver, as long as the potential
to spread exists. Most recommendations for MRSA
containment have emphasized the patient aspect:
isolation precautions, screening, treatment of car-
riers, among other things. There is much greater
hesitancy to accept that personnel may have a role
in transmission and an even greater hesitancy to
intervene in this regard.
Herein, the issue of healthcare personnel (and
allied health disciplines workers) carriage and
spread of MRSA is detailed.
Staff have a role in MRSA carriage and
transmission
Shortly after the introduction of methicillin,
patient carriers and hospital outbreaks of MRSA
were recognized, and the ﬁrst citation of a medical
staff carrier (nurse) was reported [3]. Since then,
it has been generally accepted that the hands of
healthcare personnel are critical vectors for trans-
mission of MRSA [4—12]. Whereas the use of gloves
might decrease the opportunity for hands to be con-
taminated, the burden on gloves themselves may
be equally important [13]. MRSA may be found onpportunistically in the face of antibiotic pres-
ure as methicillin became clinically used. It has
een proposed, however, that such resistance was
apable of occurring, albeit rare under a lack of
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Table 1 Episodes of MRSA spread where transmission from healthcare personnel was proposed.
Staff Context Implicated
staff
Status of staff Patient outcome Epidemiological association Reference
Nurse General hospital Single Colonized Infection Phage typing [24]
Nurses General hospital Multiple Colonized Infection & deaths Phage typing [25]
Physician Two hospitals Single Colonized & infected Infection Phage typing [26]
Nurse General hospital Single Colonized & infected Infection Phage typing [27]
No detail Burns unit Multiple Colonized Infection Phage typing [28]
Physician Newborn unit Single Colonized Infection & death Phage typing & plasmid proﬁling [29]
Midwife, physician Newborn unit Multiple Colonized & infected Infection Phage typing & plasmid digests [30]
Multiple General hospital Multiple Colonized Infection Phage typing & plasmid proﬁling [31]
Respiratory therapist General hospital Single Colonized & infected Infection Plasmid digests [32]
Nurse Intensive care unit Single Colonized Colonized Not stated [33]
Nurse Cardiovascular unit Single Colonized Colonized Phage typing & REP-PCRa [34]
Nurse, physician Burns unit Multiple Colonized Infection PFGEb [35]
Nurse Cardiovascular unit Single Colonized Infection REP-PCR [36]
Physician Surgical intensive
care unit
Single Colonized Infection BRENDAc [37]
Nurse General hospital Single Colonized Infection Phage typing [38]
Nurses, physicians General hospital Multiple Colonized & infected Infection Not stated [39]
Not detailed Not detailed Single Colonized Infection Not stated [40]
Nurses Newborn unit Multiple Colonized Infection PFGE [41]
Physician Cardiac surgery Single Colonized Infection PFGE [42]
Multiple General hospital Multiple Colonized Infection Phage typing [43]
Nurse Newborn unit Single Colonized Colonized PFGE [44]
Surgical Surgical units Single Colonized & infected Infection PFGE [45]
a Repetitive sequence polymerase chain reaction typing.
b Pulsed ﬁeld gel electrophoresis typing.
c Bacterial restriction endonuclease digest analysis of chromosomal DNA.
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Table 2 Culture-positive health care workers: clinical aspects.
(a) Screening sites which have been used to establish culture-positive status.
Nares only [21,22,26-27,31,35,37,39,43—45,50,59,62—99]
Hands only [12,100], nares/hands [11,101—107], nares/perineum [32,74,108]
Nares/throat [39,109—115], nares/hands/throat [29,116], nares/lesions [42,117]
Nares/wrists/hands [118], nares/axilla/perineum [119], nares/wrists/hands/groin [120]
Nares/throat/axilla/perineum [121,122], ﬁve sites [123,124], nares/subungual [125]
Nares/throat/hands/perineum [60]
(b) Anatomic sites where MRSA has been detected (in addition to nares and hands).
Chronic dermatitis [11,27,30,43,44,66,102,114,120,127,131,133—139]
Paronychial infection [11,136,138,140], post-operative wound [140], vaginal [140,142]
Sinus [32,45,143,144], sputum [38,141,145], ulcers [141], otitis externa [11,27,138]
Skin ulcers/wounds/abscesses [11,136,141,144], rectal [27,31], perianal/perineal [27,102,146]
Throat/tonsils [66,132,147], hair [148], conjunctival [138], facial impetigo [138]
Forehead [132], forearms/wrists [19,149], axilla [27,84,132,146]
(c) Spectrum of personnel found to carry MRSA.
Nurses [3,5,11,24—27,31—36,38,39,41,43,52,62,74,79,81,84,86,88,91,92,94—97,101—104,107,113,114,120,122,
125—131,133,134,136,138,144—148,154,158,159,161—168]
Physicians [3,11,26,29,30,31,35,37,39,42,62,66,79,84,85,92,95—97,101—103,113,125,127,130,132,145,152,165,
166,168—170]
Physiotherapist [5,11,31,39,66,84,102,107,134,146,154,171], care aide [11,35,39,81,84,95,138,165]
Respiratory therapist [5,31,32,144], radiology technician [138,154], dentist [138]
Medical student [31,154], cleaner [39,95,113,154,168], midwife [30]
Food worker [161], social worker [39], phlebotomist [39], paramedic [139]
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Ward clerk [92], administrator [168]
election, among staphylococci prior to methicillin
se [61]. Whether in endemic or epidemic form,
herefore, MRSA is likely to be found when sought,
nd the extent of ﬁndings will be dependent on the
ntensity of the investigation.
As for any acquisition of clinical specimens for
icrobial culture, the sampling technique and lab-
ratory processing may have great impact on the
requency of recovery. This is no less true for
RSA, although, by in large, enrichment and selec-
ive laboratory methods for MRSA are sufﬁciently
dvanced. Historically, the screening of health-
are personnel for MRSA has included a variety
f body sites for sampling (Table 2). Culture from
he anterior nares has been the preferred sampling
ite, but it is recognized that a gain in recov-
ry is achieved by the culture of multiple sites.
ome have used a preliminary and more limited
creening which is thereafter followed by more
xtensive sampling if initial studies are rewarding
19,39,43]. Just as there may be controversy over
hat constitutes a ‘positive’ healthcare worker,
here is also some concern about what constitutes
n appropriate set of negative cultures to deﬁne the
on-colonized healthcare worker. The latter may
e especially pertinent to decolonization treatment
fforts [21,26,39,43,59,122,126,127]. The assess-
ent of asymptomatic carriage, therefore, must
a
[
i
m], dietician [113], secretary [31]
lways be tempered by an understanding of the
imitations that the screening methods engender.
Variability in carriage has led to the use
f descriptions such as transient carriage,
hort-term carriage, and long-term carriage
81,84,105,113,128—130]. Apart from transient
arriage, which refers to positive screening sites
n one or few occasions and soon to be followed by
egative culture, the use of the terms short-term
nd long-term carriage is somewhat arbitrary.
t has been recognized that some healthcare
orkers may yield positive screens only after
shift in an endemic work setting, and thus it
as been proposed that health personnel screen-
ng should take place at the start of a shift
116,119,128]. The continuing staff reservoir for
RSA is mainly the long-term carrier, and such
issemination can be intermittent or continuous
34,36,41,45,77,79,83,84,131,132].
The anterior nares and hands are common sites
or ﬁnding MRSA. Table 2 details sites where
RSA has been isolated from healthcare person-
el. The bacterium may be found in the context
f simple carriage or active infection. Staff with
ctive infections are more likely to shed bacterium
27,32,38,45,84,114,120,141—144,150—152]. Phys-
cal trauma to workers in an endemic setting
ay facilitate subsequent MRSA infection [138].
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It has therefore been suggested that personnel
with active infections should be screened for MRSA
[117,138,153]. As for MSSA, the concept of a staff
‘disperser’ has been raised [43,150,154—157]. Such
an individual has a great propensity to shed bac-
terium from colonized or infected sites in contrast
to others who may have a similar burden of germ.
Outside of the risk factor for active infection (e.g.,
upper respiratory tract infection [37,38]), it is not
apparent why some may have a propensity to dis-
seminate MRSA more than others.
Citations for carrier personnel are most numer-
ous for nurses and second most numerous for
physicians (Table 2). As anticipated, there is con-
siderable diversity for the type of personnel that
may be carriers. The latter may be quite relevant
for circumstances where an epidemiological link
may be sought and where nurses and physicians are
the staff carriers primarily investigated. Carrier
staff may be localized to one speciﬁc service or
widely distributed throughout a facility [62,70].
There is increased carriage of MRSA in clinical
wards than elsewhere [71,84]. Younger personnel
are most likely to yield positive samples [71].
Among studies which have sought carriage, the
frequency has ranged from 0% to 91% (Table 3).
Most studies report low frequencies of carriage,
but frequencies increase with greater endemicity
among patients. Patient carriers often greatly
outnumber healthcare worker carriage in these
settings, but the potential for a greater ratio of
staff and patient carriage has been found in one
out-patient setting [62]. Some have proposed that
staff carrier rates may be so low that no such
screening should be conducted [185]. The latter
view is very much in the minority, and staff surveil-
lance cultures have been procured in numerous
outbreaks as part of the various control methods
[25—27,29,31,33,35,36,39,41—43,45,53,59,60,63,
65,70,74—77,86,92—94,96,104,106,111,113,117,
120,124,127,129,131,139,159,183,186—188]. Some
have proposed that staff screening should be an
active component of routine control methods
[36,41,43,50,51,60,111,189,190]. The results of
screening must be tempered with the possibility
that more than one strain may be found among
personnel [43,109,173] and that more than one
outbreak may be occurring simultaneously, espe-
cially in heavily endemic settings [34,80,96,110].
Furthermore, an individual may carry more than
one strain [110].Veterinary staff are no less susceptible to becom-
ing MRSA positive in the context of animal carriage
or infection [64,191], and keepers of domestic
animals have also been found to carry MRSA
[192].
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pidemiological curios
he role of strain variation in the colonization of
atients and staff and in establishing an environ-
ental burden is not well understood or studied
or that matter. Virulence potential is often how-
ver a function of selection, and it may merely
equire sufﬁcient MRSA in the appropriate con-
ext and with sufﬁcient stimulus to bring forth
he epidemic strain. Historically, the presence of
ypervirulent clones of MSSA has long been recog-
ized, and the analogy for MRSA does not require
uch imagination. MRSA can be as virulent if not
ore than MSSA, and a spectrum of disease-causing
otential among MRSA isolates is inevitable [193].
he current strains causing widespread community-
cquired MRSA infections are a testament to the
atter [194].
The acquisition of MRSA by personnel directly
rom patient contact is accepted and will likely
erve by far as the most common mode. Air-
orne transmission from patient or environment
s also a potential route [14]. Direct contact with
he contaminated environment may be important,
nd the complex environment of health care can
rovide plenty such opportunity [14,38,84]. We
ust also be cognizant of the personnel ‘envi-
onment’. Staff carriage studies are quick to
ocus on the workers’ anatomic sites for colo-
ization, but apparel (e.g., nurses uniforms and
owns [6,13,11,134,164,183,195]) may be heavily
aden [14]. Further examples of the healthcare
orker ‘environment’ include that of the home
s well as living contacts (both human and ani-
al). The general concept of household spread is
ot new [84,196,197]. The home may be heav-
ly burdened with MRSA [38,84,131], and it has
een suggested that such a reservoir may serve
o recolonize staff even when attempts to erad-
cate carriage from the healthcare institution’s
erspective have been implemented. The health-
are worker’s spouse, family, and partners may also
hare MRSA carriage and then serve to perpetu-
te MRSA in that circle (Table 4). The healthcare
orker’s spouse or partner may be the initial source
or acquisition, especially so when the other indi-
idual is a healthcare worker, especially working in
n endemic setting. Lu et al. have recently found
hat the frequency of carriage among the families
f culture-positive healthcare workers was greater
han among families of some patients [98]. The
ole for personal pets is becoming more elaborated
33,107,151,191,198].
Staff are not uncommonly employed by
ore than one institution. Physician special-
sts may rotate among multiple institutions.
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Table 3 Frequencies of healthcare worker MRSA carriage from screening exercises in both outbreak and non-outbreak settings. (ND = not detailed).
Context Outbreak
setting
Staff screened Screening method Frequency Reference
Teaching hospital Y Selected exposed personnel Nares 2/508 (0.2%) [5]
Nursing home N Direct care staff Hands 3/79 (4%) [12]
Tertiary care hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares ND (1—44%) [21]
Medical ward Y Unit staff Nares 1/25 (4%) [24]
General hospital Y Selected exposed personnel Nares 5/202 (2%) [25]
Two hospitals Y Hospital personnel Nares 10/503 (19.8%) [26]
Burn unit and surgical ward Y Nurses, physicians, various
therapists
Nares 1/182 (0.5%) [27]
Veterans’ hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 38/544 (8%) [31]
Vascular surgical ward Y ND ND 3/46 (7%) [34]
Burn unit Y Unit staff Nares 3/56 (5%) [35]
Surgical intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares 1/64 (2%) [37]
Several outbreaks Y Healthcare staff Nares or nares, throat 74/>8000 (0.9%) [39]
Maternity hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 7/53 (13%) [41]
Intensive care unit Y Unit staff and surgical team Nares, hands 1/33 (3%) [42]
Pediatrics intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares 2/42 (4%) [44]
Operating room Y Exposed personnel Nares 1/43 (2%) [45]
General hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 20/400 (5%) [59]
General hospital Unknown Nurses, physicians, auxiliary staff Nares 30/300 (6%) [62]
Veterans’ hospital Y Personnel with patient contact Nares 7/58 (12%) [63]
Tertiary care hospital Y All staff Nares 10/290 (3%) [65]
Three hospitals Y All staff Nares 27/5125 (0.5%) [66]
Dermatology day care unit Y Nursing, medical, clerical Nares ND (0%) [67]
University hospital Y Hospital staff Nares 72/2000 (4%) [68]
Nursing home N Nursing home staff Nares 6/104 (6%) [69]
General hospital N Hospital staff Nares 4/225 (2%) [70]
Teaching hospital N Various hospital staff Nares 60/965 (6%) [71]
Veterans’ hospital Y MRSA contacts Nares 0/75 (0%) [72]
Urology ward Y Unit staff Nares ND (0%) [73]
Head and neck surgery and surgical
intensive care units
Y Unit staff Nares 14/459 (3%) [74]
General hospital Y Three intensive care units Nares 10/200 (5%) [75]
Surgical units Y Selected exposed personnel Nares 14/220 (6%) [77]
Burn unit Y Selected exposed personnel Nares 2/81 (2%) [78]
General hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 9/432 (2%) [79]
Neonatal intensive care unit Y All exposed personnel Nares 3/235 (1%) [80]
Geriatrics units N Unit staff Nares (0—3%) [81]
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Table 3 (Continued )
Context Outbreak
setting
Staff screened Screening method Frequency Reference
General hospital N Hospital personnel Nares 13/71 (18%) [82]
General hospital Y Selected exposed personnel Nares 2/87 (2%) [83]
Burns unit Y Unit staff Nares 6/38 (16%) [86]
Vascular surgery services Y Nurses, physicians, surgical
assistants
Nares 4/75 (5%) [88]
Neonatal intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares 0/22 (0%) [89]
University hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 40/461 (9%) [90]
Surgical ward Y Unit staff Nares 7/13 (54%) [92]
Rehabilitation hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 1/67 (1%) [94]
General hospital N Hospital personnel Nares 5/291 (2%) [95]
Veterans’ hospital Y Selected exposed personnel Nares 13/250 (5%) [96]
Tertiary care hospital N Nurses, physicians Nares 8/226 (4%) [97]
Dialysis centre N Centre staff Nares ND (4—5%) [98]
Regional hospital N Hospital staff Nares 7/139 (5%) [99]
Neonatal unit Y Unit staff Hands 2/27 (7%) [100]
Veterans’ hospital Y Nurses and house staff Nares, hands 53/177 (29%) [101]
General hospital Y Various hospital staff Nares 32/400 (8%) [102]
Intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares, hands 26/156 (21%) [103]
Teaching hospital Y Nurses and physicians Nares, hands 3/303 (1%) [104]
Spinal cord injury unit Y Medical personnel Nares, hands 7/45 (16%) [105]
Surgical ward and operating room Y Unit staff Nares, hands ND (6%) [106]
Geriatrics rehabilitation unit Y Unit staff Nares, hands 6/25 (24%) [107]
Intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares, perineum 1/120 (0.8%) [108]
Intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares, throat 2/32 (6%) [109]
Orthopedic ward Y Unit staff Nares, throat 1/85 (1%) [112]
General hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares, throat 73/1026 (7%) [113]
Dedicated MRSA units Y Nurses, physiotherapists Nares, throat, hands 7 to 13/27 (26—48%) [116]
Surgical intensive care unit Y All unit personnel Nares, wrists, groins, ﬁngers 3/91 (3%) [120]
Male surgical unit Y Unit staff Nares, throat, axilla, perineum 2/35 (6%) [121]
Special care nursery Y All unit personnel Nares, axilla, perineum 1/83 (1%) [122]
Burns and plastics units Y All unit personnel Nares, throat, axilla, hair, feces,
perineum
0/101 (0%) [123]
Single ward Y Nurses and physicians Nares, subungual 6/56 (11%) [125]
Teaching hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 3/422 (0.7%) [127]
Isolation ward in geriatrics hospital Y Nurses Nose, throat, perineum 13/26 (50%) [128]
Pediatrics surgical unit Y Nurses Nares 7/20 (35%) [129]
Intensive care unit Y Nurses Nares 13/74 (18%) [130]
Neonatal and burn units Y Unit staff Nares, hands 10/130 (8%) [134]
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Three long-term care facilities Y Healthcare workers Nares ND (6.7—14.4%) [139]
Surgical ward Y Nurses Nares, axilla, perineum 1/17 (6%) [140]
Special care nursery Y Unit staff Nares 8/272 (3%) [143]
Vascular surgery unit Y Unit staff Nares, axilla, perineum 3/25 (12%) [146]
Burn unit Y Unit staff Nares, rectal 6/74 (8%) [148]
Out-patient clinic (infectious diseases) N Administrative and clinical staff Nares, hands 3/128 (2%) [151]
General hospital Y Hospital personnel Nares 0/22 (0%) [152]
Nursing and residential homes Y ND ND 2/162 (1%) [158]
Hospital Y ND ND 25/4963 (0.5%) [158]
Trauma centre Y Medical and nursing staff Nares, hands 1/205 (0.5%) [159]
Teaching hospital Y Hospital staff Nares 1/165 (0.6%) [162]
Nursery Y Nurses and physicians Nares 7/53 (13%) [163]
Premature infant unit Y Unit staff Nares, hands 4/40 (10%) [165]
Intensive care units in two hospitals N Nurses, physicians Hands ND (3—8%) [166]
Four general hospitals N Hospital personnel Nares 32/550 (6%) [168]
Nursing home Y Personnel with patient contact Nares 9/130 (7%) [172]
Surgical intensive care unit Y Nursing and respiratory care Nares 6/45 (13%) [173]
Isolation unit Y Unit staff Nares 1/12 (8%) [174]
Veterans’ hospital Y Selected exposed personnel Nares, hands 0/17 (0%) [175]
Dermatology ward Y Unit staff Nares, hands 0/36 (0%) [176]
Teaching hospital Y Medical personnel Nares 17/467 (4%) [177]
General hospital and nursing home Y Volunteer healthcare workers ND 4/166 (2%) [178]
Neonatal intensive care unit Y Unit staff Nares 24/389 (6%) [179]
Several hospitals Y Exposed personnel Nares, hands ND (4%) [180]
Infectious diseases hospital N Nurses, physicians Nares, throat 0/130 (0%) [181]
Burns unit Y Unit staff Nares 8/39 (21%) [182]
Newborn nursery Y Unit staff Nares, axilla, perineum 0/83 (0%) [183]
General hospital Y Ward staff Nares ND (91%) [184]
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Table 4 Citations of MRSA spread within families or immediate social contacts of MRSA-carrying healthcare workers. (ND = not detailed).
Worker role MRSA status Outbreak
related
Contact Treatment Other interventions Reference
Physician Nasal and hand carrier Y Brother, sister Nasal mupirocin Not removed from work but
required to wear mask and
to have regular
chlorhexidine/alcohol hand
scrub
[29]
Nurse Nares Y Spouse, child ND ND [31]
Respiratory therapist Nares Y Child ND ND
Nurse Nasal carrier Y Spouse Nasal mupirocin, triclosan wash ND [33]
Nurse Sputum, nasal carrier Y Spouse, child Nasal mupirocin, triclosan wash,
oral rifampin and trimethoprim
Removal from work,
decontamination of
environment
[38]
Two nurses Nasal carriers Y Children Nasal povidone-iodine cream ND [41]
Healthcare worker Chronic sinusitis Y Family member Nasal mupirocin, povidone-iodine
soap wash
Removal from work [45]
Nurse ND Y Spouse Nasal mupirocin, chlorhexidine
wash, hexaclorophane dusting
ND [66]
Seven nurses and one
technician
Nasal carriers and/or
vaginal or rectal
carrier
Y Parents, children,
spouse, partner,
friends
Nasal mupirocin, tyrothricin
lozenges, chlorhexidine mouth
rinse, ‘antiseptic’ soap,
povidone-iodine vaginal
suppositories, oral fusidic acid
and rifampin
Removal from work,
decontamination of
environment
[84]
Healthcare workers Nasal carriers N Multiple family
members
ND ND [98]
Nurse Dermatitis, throat
carrier, hair samples
Y Parents, ﬁancé Nasal mupirocin, chlorhexidine
wash, triclosan bathing, oral
rifampin and ciproﬂoxacin
Removal from work,
decontamination of
environment
[133]
Paramedic Recurrent abscesses Y Child Nasal mupirocin, ‘antiseptic’
washes
Removal from work [139]
Healthcare worker Nasal and hand carrier N Household contact Nasal mupirocin Decontamination of
environment
[151]
Nurse ND Y Partner ND ND [167]
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rainees inevitably circuit several edu-
ational medical settings. The literature
ocuments several such opportunities for spread
29,31,39,57,66,80,128,130,132,199]. Contact
ith MRSA abroad may mobilize MRSA from an area
f high endemicity to an area of low endemicity,
erhaps even introducing MRSA for the ﬁrst time
43,124].
Epidemiological analyses may raise other unique
iscoveries. For example, the acquisition of ster-
le site MRSA infections (e.g., intracranial infection
fter clean neurosurgery) in the absence of patient
olonization should raise the question of staff
ransmission and carriage [42]. Accidental contam-
nation of critical patient specimens (e.g., blood
ultures [44]) by staff carriers may complicate an
lready confusing situation.
Given these extended mechanisms of staff
cquisition and/or spread, and given the overall
reater complexity of patient and environment,
ow may the role of the health care worker in
ransmission come better into focus? Whereas a
articular setting may yield obvious clues, it may
equire more formal epidemiological analyses to
laborate on the contribution of staff carriage.
uch epidemiological links may take various forms
27,32,36,37,44—46,66,71,103,110,152,160,170,
00]. Analysis of clusters or case-control studies
ay be invoked when epidemiological links are
bvious. In many circumstances, the linkage
etween health care worker and the epidemic
acterium depends on at ﬁrst establishing com-
onality among bacterial isolates. A variety of
ngerprinting or typing techniques have been
sed for this purpose including phage typing
26,27,29,31,34,83,107,172], plasmid analyses
27,32], immunoblotting [63], repetitive element
r randomly ampliﬁed polymerase chain reac-
ion [34,92,159], restriction enzyme digest of
hromosomal DNA [37], SCCmec typing [98,99],
nd pulsed ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE)
36,37,42—45,71,80,84,99,103,110,135,160]. The
ssociations established with typing methods must
e tempered with the possibility that several
trains may be causing simultaneous outbreaks.
his is more likely to be the case when an outbreak
s prolonged or when MRSA endemicity is high.
he predominant type may change over time
54]. It is also possible that ﬁngerprinting patterns
ay vary slightly over a prolonged outbreak even
hough it is the same strain; this phenomenon
as been especially noted for PFGE [110,201].
n the author’s experience [202], an outbreak
train was consistent in its molecular type even
hough the antibiogram had changed (loss of
acrolide — erythromycin, clindamycin — resis-
t
t
s
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ance). Some epidemiological studies have shown
hat community-associated MRSA are becoming
esident in medical establishments.
However convincing, epidemiological studies
argely establish association and are rarely able
o deﬁnitively establish cause and effect rela-
ionships. Whether based on chronology, case
ontrol, eradication outcomes, ﬁngerprinting, or
ther association, we deﬁne a relative probability
or causation. That probability will then impact on
practical assumption that cause and effect will
ikely have occurred or not, and will then effect
ecision making and interventionist strategies as
ppropriate.
nterrupting the linkage
dentiﬁcation of staff carriage may or may
ot precipitate remedies perhaps depend-
ng on the priorities of the institution or the
pparent level of urgency. Whether there
as been sufﬁcient evidence to suspect a
inkage with an epidemic situation, many
ave chosen to remove the culture-positive
ealth personnel from the care environment
11,26—28,30—32,36,38,39,43,44,49,50,52,66,79,
4,95,96,104,107,118,120,121,124,127,129,134—
36,152,154,170,182,203,204]. The intent is simply
o interrupt further transmission potential, perhaps
uying time while the individual(s) is treated. This
lone has led to some success in terminating an
utbreak. Others have reassigned the employee
o a lesser risk unit [11,44,45,79], e.g., removal
o a general out-patient area from a high risk
etting such as an intensive care or burn unit.
ome have temporarily created staff—patient care
ohorts in which exposed or culture-positive staff
ay be matched to infected or carrier patients
11,26,80,86,179]. The latter approach may be
easible when there are sufﬁcient culture-positive
taff and patients to achieve a quorum, but
nevitably, the staff carriage issue will require
econciliation when patient numbers decline. It
s conceivable that staff may simply lose carriage
ver time.
Eradication protocols for carriage are widely
etailed for patients [205]. Table 5 provides detail
or treatment regimens applied to healthcare work-
rs. These strategies have varied considerably
lthough, in general, attempts have been made
o eliminate nasopharyngeal carriage with either
opical (nasal) or oral antibiotics and to eradicate
kin colonization with antibacterial treatments.
evertheless, comparisons among most studies or
he potential for pooled analyses are therefore
88
N
.
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Table 5 Treatment strategies and outcome for MRSA carriage among healthcare personnel. (ND = not detailed).
Personnel Number Setting Treatment regimen(s) Results of treatment Impact on
outbreak
Reference
Nurses and physicians 5 Two hospitals Nasal bacitracin for 5 days, oral
rifampin for 5 days, hexachlorophene
baths
Negative cultures 2 weeks
post-treatment
Y [26]
Nurse 1 Teaching hospital Nasal polymixin B-bacitracin ointment
for 3 weeks, followed by oral rifampin
for 1 week
Failed with nasal treatment but
cleared with rifampin
Y [27]
Unit staff 5 Burn unit Nasal chlorhexidine Negative cultures after 1 week Y [28]
Healthcare workers 36 Veterans’ hospital 3 non-randomized treatment
protocols: nasal bacitracin and oral
rifampin, oral rifampin and
cotrimoxazole, and oral novobiocin
and rifampin
22 became culture-negative
after ‘long-term’ follow-up
Y [31]
Respiratory therapist 1 General hospital Nasal mupirocin and oral ciproﬂoxacin
and rifampin for 7 days and then
repeated for 14 days, followed by
nasal mupirocin and oral minocycline
and rifampin along with antimicrobial
soap
Treatments did not clear MRSA
but patient spontaneously clear
the bacterium later
Y [32]
Nurse 1 Nasal mupirocin for 14 days Negative cultures after 3 months N
Nurse 1 Intensive care unit Nasal mupirocin and troclosan bathing No clearance Y [33]
Physician, nurse,
nursing assistant
3 Burn unit Nasal mupirocin for 5 days All became culture-negative Y [35]
Hospital staff 71 Multiple hospitals Selective exclusion of staff, nasal
mupirocin, chlorhexidine soap,
hexachlorophene powder, oral
rifampin and cotrimoxazole for throat
carriers
Several alternative treatments
for throat carriers, whose
culture-positive status
persisted, had variable success
N [39]
Physician 1 Surgical services Nasal mupirocin and topical mupirocin
for dermatitis
Negative cultures after 1 week Y [42]
Healthcare workers 57 Teaching hospital Nasal mupirocin for 5 days,
chlorhexidine scrub
52 of 57 became
culture-negative, 3 recolonized,
1 required repeat treatment, 1
remained culture-positive and
left work
Y [43]
Nurses 5 Veterans’ hospital Nasal and oral treatment (ND) Negative cultures after 14 days Y [63]
M
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Respiratory therapists 2
Hospital staff 5 General hospital Nasal mupirocin for 5 days and
chlorhexidine baths
4 of 5 became culture-negative and
the last required a second
treatment
Y [65]
Hospital staff 27 Three hospitals Nasal mupirocin and nasal fusidic
acid, oral rifampin for throat carriers
6 required more than one
treatment, nurse with psoriasis was
still culture-positive after 17
months
Y [66]
Nurses 8 General hospital Five persistent carriers treated
with nasal bacitracin for 14 days
4 became culture-negative and the
5th was reassigned to a
non-surgical ward
Y [79]
Physician 1
Healthcare workers 3 Neonatal intensive
care unit
Nasal mupirocin and hexachlorophene
baths for 5 days
Became culture-negative N [80]
Healthcare worker 1 General hospital Oral rifampin and cotrimoxazole Has eczematous skin and relapsed
after 6 months of treatment
N [83]
Healthcare workers 87 Two tertiary care
hospitals
Removal from work, nasal mupirocin,
tyrothricin lozenges, chlorhexidine
mouth rinse, antiseptic soap
73 became culture-negative, some
required repeat treatment and
social contact treatment and home
environmental cleaning
Y [84]
Nurses 4 Vascular surgical Hexachlorophene baths, oral rifampin
and cotrimoxazole
2 of 4 became culture-negative N [88]
Nurses 11 Veterans’ hospital Removal from work, oral rifampin
and cotrimoxazole for 10 days, 1
had nasal bacitracin only
9 of 11 were culture-negative after
1 month but 3 became
culture-positive after 4 months
N [96]
House staff 2
Hospital staff 32 Hospital Nasal mupirocin for 5 days 11 were culture-negative after 1
weeks but some became
recolonized, nasal chlorhexidine
cream failed
Y [102]
Nurses 3 Tertiary care
hospital
Removal from work, nasal bacitracin,
oral cotrimoxazole for one nurse, 5%
nasal vancomycin if nasal bacitracin
was unsuccessful
2 responded to nasal vancomycin Y [104]
Unit staff 6 Rehabilitation unit Nasal mupirocin, chlorhexidine baths All initially became
culture-negative but 2 of 6
required a repeat treatment
Y [107]
Hospital staff 135 Teaching hospital Nasal mupirocin for 5 days and
triclosan soap, oral rifampin and
cotrimoxazole if the topical treatment
was unsuccessful
Reduction in culture-positive staff
members (along with a decrease in
culture-positive patient numbers)
Y [111]
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Table 5 (Continued )
Personnel Number Setting Treatment regimen(s) Results of treatment Impact on
outbreak
Reference
Unit staff 3 Neonatal unit Removal from work, nasal
chlorhexidine, hexachlorophene bath
for skin carrier
2 of 3 became culture-negative,
skin carrier required 3
consecutive treatments
Y [118]
Nurses 3 Surgical intensive
care unit
Removal from work, hexachlorophene
baths, nasal bacitracin or nasal
tetracycline
2 of 3 still culture-positive after
8 months but 1 of these became
culture-negative with oral
rifampin
Y [120]
Hospital staff 3 Teaching hospital Nasal bacitracin, hexachlorophene
baths, oral rifampin oral rifampin and
cotrimoxazole for 5 days
Became culture-negative Y [127]
Nurse 1 ND Removal from work, nasal mupirocin,
chlorhexidine mouth wash, triclosan
bathing, oral rifampin and
ciproﬂoxacin
Success required simultaneous
treatment of social contacts and
eradication from the home
environment
ND [133]
Healthcare workers Multiple Long-term care
facilities
Removal from work, nasal mupirocin
for 5 days, antiseptic baths
Statistically signiﬁcant reduction
in culture-positive staff after
treatment interventions
Y [139]
Hospital staff 58 University hospital Nasal neomycin/bacitracin cream and
chlorhexidine soap, removal from
work
42 became culture-negative, 12
required additional nasal
mupirocin treatment, 4 required
two consecutive mupirocin
treatments
Y [154]
Nurse 1 Hospital district Nasal mupirocin Negative cultures N [158]
Physician 1 Surgical services Nasal chlorhexidine and
hexachlorophene bath, nasal
chlorhexidine and bacitracin,
nebulized chlorhexidine and
bacitracin, nasal and oral fusidic acid
Treatments failed but
spontaneous clearance occurred
after removal from the hospital
Y [169]
Personnel 9 Nursing home Oral rifampin for 10 days Negative cultures after 1 month N [172]
Healthcare workers 17 Teaching hospital Nasal mupirocin All initially culture-negative but
some relapsed
ND [177]
Healthcare workers 68 Double-blinded
treatment study
Nasal mupirocin for 5 days (N = 34)
versus placebo (N = 34)
Culture-negative in 71% of
treatment group and 18% of
controls at 3 months
N [206]
Volunteer healthcare
workers
14 Six randomized
trials of workers
from several
settings
Nasal mupirocin for 5 days versus
placebo
Culture-negative for 8 of 9 in
treatment group versus 1 of 5 in
the control group after 4 weeks
of treatment
ND [207]
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tRSA and healthcare personnel
umbersome. Overall, the majority of healthcare
orkers have carriage interrupted after treat-
ent. Some require repeat or alternate treatment
trategies. Clearance of carriers with protocols as
imple as nasal mupirocin for 5 days is common
hen surveillance cultures are repeated in the
hort-term (usually weeks). Such a high probabil-
ty for short-term success has led some to have
ealthcare workers return shortly after removal.
elapse or re-infection with similar or different
trains is most often detected after several months.
asopharyngeal treatment has relied mainly on
upirocin ointment in recent times, and oral
herapy has mainly included rifampin and cotri-
oxazole. Plenty of these studies propose that
etection and eradication of the healthcare worker
arrier state has been associated with beneﬁt to
utbreak control. More complex carriage states
rovide obstacles to decontamination, e.g., rectal
arriers [19]. Mupirocin resistance is now emerging
208]. Attempt has been made to recolonize the
asopharynx of MRSA carriers with non-pathogenic
SSA [169].
It is not surprising that treatment protocols
or MRSA carriage are becoming more widely
dopted [43,46,50,60,117,186,209]. Most contem-
orary guidelines for MRSA management have
ncluded treatment regimens for staff carri-
rs. Initially, the trend was to incorporate a
asal treatment preparation such as bacitracin
r chlorhexidine cream, but the preference
hanged to mupirocin [201,209]. Thereafter, rec-
mmended treatment included nasal mupirocin and
ral antibiotic(s) depending on the circumstance
43,46,49,50]. The subsequent need for using a
ombination of nasal, oral, and topical skin treat-
ents became more evident [117,119].
Some have adopted employee screening pro-
rams [39,43,51]. Conscientious staff have asked
irectly to be involved in screening [39]. Educa-
ional tools to impress staff have included hand
mprint cultures [117].
The infection control mandate for patient
solation and the associated healthcare worker pre-
autions can have a role in reducing staff carriage.
or example, the role of masks [116] may impact on
asopharyngeal contamination. Soiled gowns may
e removed and laundered.
ialogue, disagreement, and discordhe decision to screen and/or treat patients for
arriage has been debated, and surveillance has
ot been routinely adopted. For example, infec-
ious disease consultants are largely divided on
p
i
n
i
r91
he role that multidrug-resistant bacterium surveil-
ance maintains in management [210]. Boyce [55]
reviously summarized opinions and found that
either screening nor treatment of carriers was
ommon. Surveillance of health care personnel has
rawn much less attention and has generated con-
roversy.
The removal of staff carriers from the work
nvironment has been associated with a number
f dilemmae. The disruption of work schedules,
nd the potential ensuing shortage of staff can
reate difﬁculty [36,113,153]. Circumstances have
risen where staff cohorting and exclusion could
ot be achieved due to staff shortage [80,110]. A
elay of return to work until carriers are deemed
ulture-negative may prolong a furlough [84]. Some
ay be transient carriers and perhaps unnecessar-
ly removed from work [36]. Long-term carriage
ay occur and difﬁculty may arise in determining
eturn to work [40]. In one series, chronic car-
iers were responsible for up to 70% of all lost
ork days [84]. Some chronic carriers have required
change in career [43]. Loss of trainee experi-
nce and a shortage of available physicians may
rise when the carrier is a physician in train-
ng [169]. Several have observed psychological
tress for reasons including the stigma of being
ulture-positive, personal concern about having
otentially caused outbreaks or patient suffering,
he need to potentially have home and social con-
acts examined, and the anxiety about professional
areers [36,40,43,84,113,153,171,185]. Logistical
roblems also then arise regarding the costs of
upplemental staff, the need to involve other
ospital constituencies (e.g., occupational health
nd safety), and the treatment and/or follow-up
84,185]. Healthcare workers will be loathe to par-
icipate when mandated time off of work may be
harged to personal sick days [43] and when worker
ompensation agencies may not readily accept cov-
rage for prolonged furlough.
The compliance of healthcare workers in MRSA
ontrol is a critical issue, and the need for staff to
buy in’ continues to be re-emphasized [211]. Poor
ompliance with handwashing is a systemic prob-
em and may occur despite the healthcare workers’
nowledge [9,70,212]. Some facilities lack readily
vailable handwashing stations [212]. There may
lso be poor compliance with established clinical
nd surgical practice [45], primary infection con-
rol prevention guidelines [9], or MRSA isolation
recautions [212]. Such non-compliance may be
nadvertent or voluntary [213]. One study found
on-compliance to be greater in settings such as
ntensive care where procedures were at high
isk for contamination and where the burden of
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patient care was concentrated [9]. Maximization
of staff productivity could conﬂict with patient
care standards. In France, only 23% of hospital
employees knew of MRSA protocols and only 1.8%
of MRSA patient venues had appropriate isola-
tion signs. Screening effects may be thwarted if
staff are reluctant to provide samples; address-
ing this issue with staff can lead to a high rate of
participation [111]. The failure to adequately erad-
icate carriage after treatment may lower morale.
The experience of side-effects among some carrier
treatment attempts may trigger resistance among
other staff for whom eradication has been pro-
posed [153]. Treatment failure of carriage may also
occur purely due to the frank refusal to accept
eradication regimens [84]. Some have suggested
that culture-negative status for healthcare workers
could promote a false sense of security [70]. Such
discord and controversies have the potential to cre-
ate strained relationships with infection control
services and/or management [40,113], and mistrust
and non-compliance may especially be accentuated
with the spectre that MRSA carriage might interfere
with careers. Educational efforts at both individ-
ual and group levels is imperative [211]. Much in
the way of impediment may be created when the
‘leadership’ is obstructionist [211,213]. Jarvis and
Ostrowsky have crystallized this issue, ‘‘we have
the science, now we need the will to implement
the science into clinical practice for prevention.’’
[214].
Reticence of staff to participate in screening may
relate to potential lack of anonymity. A potential
solution may be the use of conﬁdentiality codes for
staff specimens [46]. An occupational health and
safety bureau or something similar may receive the
mandate to co-ordinate and code the processing
of staff samplings. A close interaction thereafter
between the latter coordinating function and the
infection control service would be imperative in
order for the potential missing link to be acknowl-
edged during the epidemiological analyses.
Cost of MRSA control no doubt plays a large
part in many deliberations. Gould has aptly sum-
marized the phenomenal costs of MRSA infection
[215]: in the United States, there are billions of
dollars in excess medical expenditures and in the
United Kingdom, billions of pounds in resources are
lost. In one setting, up to 250% in increased costs
have been associated with MRSA [187]. Although
outbreak control expenditures may be consider-
able, microbiology costs comprise 10% or less, and
a smaller fraction will be attributable to screening
of healthcare workers if such an exercise is deemed
necessary [66]. Mehtar [216] calculated that it is six
times cheaper to treat a carrier than an infected
c
c
e
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atient; the latter ratio is likely to be emulated
hen the carrier is one of the medical personnel.
n France, costs may include litigation [45]. How
oes one factor in costs to the patient (i.e., mor-
idity and mortality) and families? Control of MRSA
s therefore highly cost-effective [215]. It is disap-
ointing to caregivers, patients, and public to learn
hat control might not be mobilized even when
unds are available [217].
The professional will and conscious effort that
s required to control MRSA lies across a spectrum
f intensity. ‘Search and destroy’ measures rep-
esent one end of that spectrum [111]. On the
ther pole, there is a perception that MRSA con-
rol approaches may be too disruptive [218]. There
ay be a feeling that staff screening, for example,
ay be an ‘‘unhelpful ritual’’ [185] or a mode of
enalizing staff [40]. It may be that the evolution
f conﬂict between the infection control services
nd health care personnel could become unhelp-
ul in managing an outbreak [113]; a perception
an arise whereby the control ‘cure’ is worse than
he (MRSA) infection [153]. The lack of absolutely
eﬁnitive evidence from clinical randomized trials
ay be argued by others as a negative in apply-
ng such tools as staff screening [219]. There are
any, however, who favour a ‘culture’ of altruism
nd of maintaining the integrity of infection control
ractice to be near sacred. Perhaps MRSA contain-
ent may be treated as a key quality indicator, and
ne might also propose that there is no level for
hich MRSA control interventions are not warranted
219]. Perhaps the problems with implementing
taff screening techniques, even when epidemio-
ogically warranted, are administrative in nature
nd require but ‘‘teeth and money’’ [219]. Perhaps
any staff are quite willing to participate in pre-
ention beyond the expectations of their managers
147].
Envisage a situation of an institutional outbreak
here the infections have created considerable
orbidity and have been responsible for death.
he infection control ofﬁcer and team establish
t a critical time, along with other personnel and
dministrators, that a few staff carriers may be
mplicated, however inadvertently, in propagating
he outbreak. A consensus initiates a limited staff
creening. As surveillance progresses expeditiously
nd well, some administration and medical staff
ecide to interrupt the screening program. Com-
letion of the screening nevertheless determines
ritical staff linkages conﬁned to few personnel, the
ontrol being manageable with few resources and
fforts. In the interim, opponents have emerged
nd activate a plot to politically denigrate the
nfection control ofﬁcer. The latter evolves to the
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ERSA and healthcare personnel
rogression of a bogus harassment process in which
t is claimed that the ofﬁcer’s involvement in pre-
enting infection is but a deliberate harassment of
ome medical staff. The antagonists’ intents, fur-
hered by administrators, include removal of the
nfection control ofﬁcer from his position and the
nstitution. The latter unfortunately is a true and
iving example of the abuse that infection control
ractitioners may suffer in order to maintain a safe
nvironment for all.
The screening of staff must be engaged as
equired with such issues of professional integrity in
ind. Of all control measures that may brush med-
cal personnel wrongly during an MRSA outbreak,
he screening, removal, treatments, and follow-
p of themselves is likely to attract considerable
econd thought. For good reasons, Vermund and
awal have ventured to elaborate on the profes-
ional integrity issue outright [220]. Ethical issues
re not new, and there is an inherent personal and
olitical ‘risk’ to individuals working in infection
ontrol. Some administrators and medical person-
el may not be fond of control efforts; even for an
ssue as seemingly simple as staff screening, there
ill be conﬂicts more or less. Professional integrity
ust remain foremost, and with good will, we are
undamentally employees of the patient before we
re employees of institutions. Will written ethical
uidelines be required to convince and motivate
ealth care personnel and then protect infection
ontrol protagonists [220]?
oving forward on strength
n the past, hospitals uncommonly accepted MRSA
ontrol measures which were aimed at intervening
ith carrier personnel [55]. The pendulum is now
uickly moving in the opposite direction. Boyce [53]
ecommended staff screening and treatment in epi-
emics although noting that evidence for the same
as supportive albeit non-conclusive. A review of
merican guidelines by some and an independent
ask force were consistent in acknowledging a use-
ul role for screening healthcare workers when
pidemiological linkages were evident [200,203].
n the United Kingdom, both former and revised
uidelines supported staff screening in moderate
nd high risk areas, in the presence of epidemi-
logical links, if transmission continued despite
dequate control measures, or as unusual epidemi-
logical patterns emerged [117,119]. The screening
f active staff, the screening of temporary staff,
he exclusion of colonized staff from work, and
he treatment of staff carriers received Categories
B and 2 support by their published deﬁnitions.
R93
n the United States, two compatible guidelines
upport a monitoring of healthcare worker hand
ygiene, screening efforts, and treatment of car-
iers [6,221]. The latter is promoted by Category
B evidence as for their particular deﬁnitions. The
trict approach taken by Dutch authorities and
any others worldwide are detailed throughout
his paper and highlighted by Wagenvoort [188].
artstein’s interpretation of McGowan [222] is
propos here in that the solution for MRSA control
ill depend on an adaptation of broad guide-
ines to the niches where they will be applied.
hereas the approach to staff screening and treat-
ent may be nationally or internationally driven
nd locally implemented, they should always be
atient-oriented.
Calls for infection control proactivity are
phemeral [2]. The movement for MRSA control is
imely and necessary [188,223—228]: at all levels,
e need more Mutos and Farrs and Dancers and
immons and Casewells and Vos and Verbrughs and
arringtons and their like-minded. Institutions with
igh endemicity can achieve control [227]. Posi-
ive attitudes, co-operation, bravery to challenge
riorities, grasping ownership, and sustainability of
urveillance and responses are all critical. The more
mmediate danger is the threat that comes from
hose who feel overwhelmed by MRSA [227].
The role of healthcare workers in MRSA control
s undeniable for many reasons, and the poten-
ial for healthcare workers to directly or indirectly
ropagate MRSA is real although situationally vari-
ble. Where resources are highly constrained, the
ole of healthcare worker carriage during MRSA
ontrol may deserve analysis although less subse-
uent effort. In some instances, it may become
atently obvious and deserving that considerable
fforts and resources be directed to healthcare
orker screening and treatment. The intensity of
ny such efforts should be contoured by multi-
isciplinary guidelines, investigative efforts, local
olutions, and goodwill.
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